





















This paper studies migration decisions of very poor households in an environment of high level 
of violence. By matching detailed retrospective data on violence levels in Colombian rural 
municipalities with a household survey collected for the evaluation of the “Familias en Acción” 
welfare programme, the empirical analysis takes into account possible selection problems of the 
sample and the key issue of endogeneity of violence. The main results show that high levels of 
violence encourage households to leave their municipality of residence but that welfare 
programmes may mitigate these flows, provided that the incidence of violence is not unduly 
high. This is consistent with the fact that the households under study are liquidity constrained: 
when violence is high, cash transfers may enable them to leave their municipality of residence, 
whereas, in more normal circumstances, receiving cash transfers increases the benefits to stay 
where they are registered. Further evidence using household shocks and wealth confirm that 
liquidity constraints play a large role in explaining such heterogeneous impacts of the 
programme along violence levels. Other important determinants of migration are the type of 
property rights and the health insurance rural households can benefit from. 
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Colombia’s civil conflict over the last 40 years has displaced many families and individuals from 
their villages of origin. Estimates vary, but it is clear that the problem has become, especially in 
recent decades, a very important one. At least 1.8 million individuals were involuntary displaced 
during the last 15 years, which corresponds to 4.3 percent of the country’s population and 14 
percent of the rural population (Arboleda and Correa, 2003). Casual visits to the main cities in 
Colombia provide abundant evidence of the problem: displaced individuals are visible in poor 
neighbourhoods and more generally on the streets. The consequences of such displacement can 
be dramatic. In addition to the direct act of violence that causes the displacement, individuals 
often lose their livelihood, productive assets and valuable skills, the human capital they possess 
is often inadequate in the new environments, children are removed from school, young people 
leave rural villages and so on and so forth. Evidence has accumulated showing that migrants to 
the main cities in the 1990’s fared worse than the urban poor, in contrast with the traditional 
migrant profile (see Vélez, 2002, Table 7) and that displaced population are as poor as the 
poorest population of Colombia even if they are from more heterogeneous backgrounds with 
higher education levels of household heads (Attanasio, Castro, Mesnard, 2005). They are 
particularly vulnerable to malnutrition and health problems such that their average rate of 
mortality is 6 times higher than the national average (World Food Program, 2003). 
 
Recently policy makers have shown an increasing interest in building policy interventions to 
mitigate these flows. Discussions have mainly focused on whether and how to encourage 
displaced households to return to their origin villages. For example the Colombian government 
has already considered granting compensation conditional on the return of displaced households. 
One possible alternative is to discourage displacement in the first place by making everyone 
better off at home. In this prospect, welfare programmes may contribute to stabilise the socio-
economic environment in rural villages by encouraging households to remain in their 
municipalities of origin. This may also undermine one systematic strategy used by rebels groups, 
whose aim is to take control over destabilised areas by terrorising civilians. 
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In this paper, we leave aside the question as to whether or not migration of very poor households 
should be encouraged in such a context and adopt, instead, a positive approach. To understand 
better the decision made by very poor households of leaving small towns affected by violence, 
we measure the relative contribution of different factors in this decision, including household and 
community variables, policy measures and violence incidence. Aside from the large set of 
variables we are able to use given the richness of our survey and the size of our sample, the main 
originality of this work is to allow violence levels to interact with policy interventions, as well as 
with other migration determinants. 
  
Importantly, we do not want to focus exclusively on episodes that lead to displacement, but 
rather put these episodes within the context of a set of different incentives, which include 
economic incentives. For this reason, throughout the paper, the concept of mobility we use is 
different from that used in the literature on violence and displacement, which focuses on the 
displaced individuals that arrive in big cities after large shocks and violent experiences (Engel 
and Ibanez, 2007). While this is surely important, it is also important to start from the small 
communities and check what happens to individuals that, while affected by violence and other 
problems, do not necessarily move to the big cities but to other places or stay in their 
municipalities of residence. These decisions are not necessarily entirely forced but may still be 
directly affected by the high levels of violence prevailing in Colombian municipalities. 
 
The first aim of the paper is to assess whether traditional motives for economic migration apply 
to households living in the particularly unstable and violent environment characterising rural 
Colombia. This is because migration for economic reasons may have different determinants from 
forced migration, as developed in the next section. To do so we study how migration 
determinants change when the incidence of violence varies, using its variation across 
municipalities we observe in our survey. Moreover, our data allow us to capture several 
dimensions of violence, as well as other shocks affecting household income that may interact 
with migration determinants. 
 
The second aim of the paper is to assess the impact on migration of policy interventions such as 
the Familias en Acción (hereafter FA) program we consider in this paper. Run by the Colombian 4 
 
government with a loan from the IADB and the World Bank, the programme is modelled after 
the Mexican PROGRESA and consists of conditional cash transfers that aim at improving the 
nutrition and education of the poorest Colombians. Although FA was not designed specifically to 
affect migration behaviour, there are many ways in which household mobility might respond to 
it. On one hand, receiving the benefits of the programme makes living in a municipality where 
the programme operates (hereafter “treated municipality”) more attractive than living in a 
municipality where it does not (“control municipality”).
 On the other hand, receiving cash 
transfers may also help relaxing financial constraints of very poor households, and, hence, allow 
them to finance their migration if migration returns are high relative to its costs. Since these two 
effects play in opposite direction, the effect of receiving the programme on a household mobility 
is a priori ambiguous.  
 
To test the model’s predictions and address the first question, the empirical analysis allows the 
FA programme to affect differently migration decisions in municipalities characterised by 
different levels of violence. The heterogeneous impacts we find suggest that different 
mechanisms are into playing depending on the level of violence. In a nutshell, our results show 
that cash transfers are discouraging very poor households to migrate out of their municipality of 
residence. But this is only the case if violence is not unduly high. Where violence is very high, 
we find some evidence that cash transfers loosen liquidity constraints and allow very poor 
households to leave their municipality of residence. These results suggest that compensatory 
cash transfers to households affected by violence could be envisaged as a way of curbing 
migration from unstable areas provided violence levels in such areas are not too high. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the literature, which motivates 
the empirical model of household migration under violence we estimate. Section 3 presents the 
data, Section 4, the empirical strategy, Section 5, the main results on the impacts of violence on 
migration and its interaction with the programme effects, while Section 6 discusses other 
determinants explaining migration decisions of the very poor households in our sample. Section 
7 concludes by establishing policy recommendations based on our main findings. 
 
2 Migration of very poor households under violence 5 
 
 
There is a large economic literature on the determinants of migration, which has recently 
expanded to study displacement. However, to our knowledge, very few economists have studied 
the impact of policy interventions such as welfare programmes on migration decisions and there 
is no study of how these impacts may differ in environments characterised by high levels of 
violence. After reviewing briefly the related strands of literature, this section motivates why 
migration responses to the programme may depend on the level of violence. 
 
2.1 literature on migration and displacement 
 
The framework established by Harris and Todaro (1970) to explain economic migration 
postulates that individuals compare their present wage with that available in a potential 
destination area, adjusted for the probability of finding a job. Models have since been expanded 
to take into account more complex determinants of migration decisions, such as individuals’ 
heterogeneity in education and age, which affect migration’s returns over the life-cycle in line 
with Sjaastad, 1962 or problems linked to incomplete information, which may be an important 
factor in explaining repeated or sequential migration (Pessino, 1991), as individuals accumulate 
human capital together with information (Da Vanzo, 1983).
2 More recently, economists and 
sociologists have outlined the role played by the family and other social networks. In line with 
Stark (1992), the “New economic of migration” considers migration as a household strategy to 
diversify risk by sending some members to distant areas while keeping others working close by 
on farm. There has been a recent upsurge of interest in the role of social networks, which may 
help migrants to cross the borders (Espinosa and Massey, 1997) or propose them services in 
destination areas, such as to find more easily jobs and accommodation. This may diminish 
migration costs (Massey et al., 1987, Munshi, 2003), which, in turn, become endogenous to the 
migration process (Carrington et al.,1996). 
 
The economic literature on the impact of violence on migration is not very developed, partly due 
to the scarcity of available data, partly because this field was left under the domain of political 
scientists until very recently. However, in a seminal paper, Schultz (1971) finds a positive effect 
                                                 
2 For a more detailed review see, for example, Greenwood, 1997. 6 
 
of the incidence of homicides on net internal migration rates from 1951 to 1964 in Colombia. 
Morrison and May (1994) use an expected utility framework, which postulates that households 
leave their area of origin when their utility to stay is smaller than their utility to move, taking into 
account all socio-political and economic benefits and costs attached to different locations. Their 
estimates show that political violence is a key determinant of internal migration rates in 
Guatemala. Using aggregate data, however, these authors cannot capture easily the 
microeconomic underpinnings of household migration decisions in violent context, which is the 
main objective of our study.  
 
However, there has been a growing attention paid to the consequences of civil conflicts on 
displacement and asylum seekers (see for example Azam and Hoeffler, 2002, Hatton, 2004, or 
Czaika and Kis-Katos, 2009). Although we may argue that forced migration and economic 
migration are of different nature, we cannot exclude that these two decisions have common 
factors. This may explain why, very often, only part of households from communities targeted by 
illegal armed groups decides to move. To capture this feature Engel and Ibanez (2007) model 
displacement decisions and show that predictions of such models are sometimes opposite to 
those of traditional migration models. For example, households with immobile assets like large 
plots of land that can be easily sized by rebels may feel more threatened by violence and, hence, 
are encouraged to move first, contrary to what the standard economic literature would predict. 
Similarly, risk aversion may induce individuals to displace in a violent context, whereas the same 
individuals would not have migrated in a stable context, because of the uncertainties involved by 
migration decisions (Fischer et al, 1997). Or individuals with political responsibilities in their 
municipalities may be the first targeted by rebel or paramilitary forces in their strategies to 
destabilise rural areas and take control over them. This also outlines the complex role that social 
capital is likely to play in the migration decision under violence. Then any advantage to belong 
to a society (and may discourage migration) like active participation in community activities or 
high education levels may also turn into a risk factor and encourage displacement. 
 
Similarly to Engel and Ibanez (2007) or Czaika and Kis-Katos (2009), the model we estimate 
combines factors linked to violence and economic determinants to explain migration decisions. 
Furthermore, it allows the level of violence to affect not only directly the well-being of 7 
 
households attached to a given location and, hence, their migration decisions, but also the 
migration incentives associated to other factors. This argument, firstly outlined by Morrison and 
May (1994), has not been fully exploited since to study migration decisions in more normal 
circumstances than displacement.  
 
2.2 Impacts of conditional cash transfer programmes on migration under violence 
 
Among these factors, we will focus on the role played by welfare benefits that are not necessarily 
available everywhere or require specific conditions to be eligible, such that they are not easily 
transferable to a destination area.
3 To our knowledge, only one paper by Angelucci (2005) 
investigates the impacts of a welfare programme, the PROGRESA conditional cash transfer 
programme in Mexico, on migration decisions. However, its focus on international migration of 
workers from Mexico, where communities have experienced large international labour migration 
flows in the past and formed important migration networks in the US, is very different from this 




Welfare programmes, such as FA under study, may affect ambiguously the incentives for poor 
households to migrate out of their residence municipality. We may, first, expect that they 
increase the attractiveness of living in municipalities receiving welfare benefits through several 
channels. Apart from the unconditional monetary supplement of 46,500 pesos (around US$20) 
eligible households receive complementary cash transfers, which are conditional on school 
attendance of children -14,000 pesos (US$6) and 28,000 pesos (US$12) per child going to 
primary and secondary school respectively.
5 These transfers are thus a substantial part of 
household income, representing more than 20% of the average monthly labour income of 
                                                 
3To be eligible for the FA programme in 2002 a household needs to be registered in a municipality receiving the 
treatment and to be very poor as indicated by a household poverty index established in 1999 for the last time before 
the programme started. 
4 Our model’s predictions differ from Angelucci (2005) who investigates individual migration financed by families. 
As a consequence, the unconditional part of the transfers is not lost if a household member is sent away to work. Her 
results differ from ours in a number of points and, in particular, in that the PROGRESA programme in Mexico does 
not affect significantly internal migration of Mexican workers. 
5 These amounts are to be compared with the average monthly labour income in our sample, around 250,000 pesos. 
These are the amounts in 2002, with an average annual exchange rate of $US1=2,275 Colombian pesos. 8 
 
families in our sample. Aside from increasing household income through cash transfers, these 
welfare programmes may also mitigate aggregate (village) risk by giving poor households a 
certain source of income and have spillover effects on non beneficiary households (Angelucci 
and De Giorgi, 2009). As in the first two years of the programme, the programme was not 
implemented everywhere (340,000 households were registered to participate in 622 
municipalities of Colombia), one can easily understand that being exposed to the programme 
may discourage migration of the very poor households eligible for it.  
 
Second, cash transfers may contribute to relax household liquidity constraints and increase 
household mobility if migration benefits are higher than migration costs. In these conditions, as 
the violence incidence varies a lot across the rural areas under study, the programme may affect 
differently migration incentives of households depending on their environment and threats they 
receive. This is because, by relaxing cash constraints, the programme may allow some 
households to migrate when violence levels are high, whereas the same households would not be 
willing to migrate in a more stable environment. After showing below that the households under 
study are very likely to be liquidity constrained in their migration decisions, we will test for 
possible heterogeneous programme impact on migration depending on violence levels, as well as 





31 Data collection 
 
We use a large and high quality data set, whose collection was started in 2002 with the purpose 
of evaluating the Familias en Acción programme. The FA survey collected information on 
11,612 households living in 122 (relatively small) representative rural municipalities, 57 of 
which were receiving the programme based on the requisites that they had less than 100,000 
inhabitants, at least a bank and a minimum level of health and education infrastructure and 65 of 
which were not. Within each municipality, all families in the poorest quintile of the population 
according to a basic welfare indicator, the “SISBEN”, and with children between 0 and 17 years 9 
 
old, were potential beneficiaries of the programme. A sample of about 100 households was 
surveyed from each municipality for the evaluation. 
 
The first data collection (which we refer to as the baseline data) was done just before the start of 
the new programme.
6 For the second data collection, which was executed in 2003, we invested a 
considerable amount of resources to track down households that had moved since the baseline 
survey and, to these households, a newly designed module on mobility was administered, from 
which information on migration costs and main reasons of migration are described below. 
Moreover, we constructed extensive locality questionnaires that were administered to three 
‘local’ authorities (such as the mayor, the programme official and the priest), which are used 
extensively to control for local amenities and violence incidence in the empirical model. All 
variables are summarised in Table 1 in Appendix. 
 
To assess the impact of violence on migration decisions, different sources of information from 
the FA data have been used. The first type of variables comes from the part of the FA 
questionnaire on public infrastructure that gives information on the presence of taskforce 
desertion and taskforce strike due to violence in any health centre of the municipality. Secondly 
we use three variables that describe the perception by the surveyors of some problems linked to 
violence when they visited the municipalities. These are three dummy variables equal to one if, 
respectively, there was a curfew, if there were some paramilitaries/FARC/or ELN forces, or if 
there were some problems related to violence in the municipalities. The last type of variables 
measuring the levels of violence comes from the special module of the questionnaire applied to 
the municipality leaders who mention whether some displaced households have left and joined 
the municipality during the year before the baseline survey. 
                                                 
6 The evaluation and the survey were organized by a consortium made of Econometria, IFS and SEI. In some of the 
‘treatment’ towns, the programme was started by the government before the baseline survey. These issues and the 
data collected for the evaluation are discussed in detail in Attanasio et al. (2006). 10 
 
Table 1 shows that migrant households live in more violent municipalities where health centres 
are more often affected by violence, where curfews, problems of public order and illegal armed 
groups are more frequently reported, and from where more displaced households have left in the 
recent past, as represented also in Figure 2. 
 
Finally, it should be mentioned that some basic information dated to 1999 exists for all the 
households in the survey and a set of other households that were in the village in 1999 but had 
left as of the 2002 data collection.
7 We will use this information as well as retrospective 
information on violence incidence in municipalities coming from the Police in order to control 
for potential selection problems in the FA survey. 
 
The first follow up survey to the Familias en Acción database was a success: attrition was 
relatively low at 6%. This was partly due to the mechanisms we put in place to track households 
and partly to low mobility rate between 2002 and 2003 that we now turn to describe. 
 
3.2 Definition of the sample 
 
The empirical analysis focuses on a sample of 434 households who have moved out of their 
municipality of residence between the baseline and the first follow-up survey -hereafter called 
“migrants”- as well as 11178 households who have not, the “non migrants” and the information 
given by these households at baseline.
8   
 
To identify the households who have moved out of their municipality of residence, we use 
detailed reports by the surveyors on the reasons why some households can not be found at 
follow-up. In total, among the 710 households that cannot be re-interviewed, 434 households are 
reported as having moved out of the village. For the remaining 276, interviewers were not able to 
establish the reason for non-contact in the follow up. In total, therefore, only 434 households or 
3.7% of the sample have changed municipality for sure between the baseline and the follow-up 
                                                 
7The 2002 sample was obtained by first sampling more than 21600 households from the 1999 SISBEN lists in the 
relevant municipalities. Of these households, on which we have  as set of about 8 variables dated 1999, more than 
11600 were still living in the same village and entered the sample.  
8The reasons why we do not study household mobility within the municipality of residence nor individual migration 
are explained in the appendix. 11 
 
surveys. Moreover, among these 434 households, 114 households were eventually tracked by the 
interviewers and administered a special questionnaire on migration, which we use to describe 
their self-reported motivations to migrate in the Appendix and their migration costs below. 
 
Concerning this very low migration rate a few remarks are important to note. One possibility 
considered is to add add the remaining 276 households that were not surveyed again at follow up 
for unknown reasons to the sample of “migrants”, in which case the migration rate in the sample 
would be around 6%. However, we checked that these 276 households are different from the 
sample of migrants in a number of dimensions (in particular they have good health insurance 
(see below for the discussion of this variable) and they live in municipalities with low violence 
incidence), which probably reflects that they have not migrated out of their municipality of 
origin, or other more complex selection issues. For these reasons we decided not to add these 
households to the sample of migrants. 
 
Second, we have to bear in mind that these migration flows are not representative of all 
migration flows in Colombia but only of the mobility among the poorest households in Colombia 
targeted by the programme, which are likely to be liquidity constrained. Migration costs reported 
by migrants to the interviewers are sizeable: median costs are around 50,000 pesos and mean 
costs around 103,037 pesos, which represent respectively 13% of the median monthly 
expenditure (including auto-consumption) and 24% of the mean monthly expenditure of 
households in the sample at baseline (the distribution of migration costs of the 114 successfully 
tracked households is represented in Figure 1).
 Moreover, to finance their migration, 2/3 of 
households used their own funds, 1/3 was helped by friends or relative and none relied on any 
kind of credit or loan. As the households in the sample are very poor and it is difficult to get 
loans to finance migration, it is perhaps not too surprising to observe low migration rates. .  
 
Third, we may suspect the FA  sample to be not a fully random sample of very poor households 
as more than 40 % of the households that were present in the municipalities in 1999 for the 
SISBEN survey were no longer available in July 2002, when the baseline survey of the FA 
started. As we are effectively observing a sample of ‘stayers’ it might be that mobility for them is 12 
 
particularly low. Not controlling for this source of possible selection of our sample would, hence, 
result in biased estimates, a key issue we address in the empirical strategy below. 
 
4 Empirical analysis 
 
To estimate the impacts of the FA welfare programme on household migration and their 
interactions with violence levels in the municipalities, we estimate a Probit model of migration, 
as follows : 
  { } 12 3 4 5 i j 1 Treat Violence Violence *Treat 'X 0 ij ij ij ij ij ij Y αα α α α ε =+ + + + + >  (1) 
where : 
ij Y      =1  if household i moves out of the municipality of residence j between the 
baseline and the follow up surveys, 0 otherwise; 
Treatij    = 1   if household i lives in a treated municipality at baseline, 0 otherwise; 
Violenceij  violence level in the municipality j where household i lives at baseline; 
ij X  vector of control variables for household and village characteristics at baseline; 
ij ε   error term, correlated across households within municipalities. 
Note that we do not observe the destinations chosen by most migrant households –apart from 
those successfully tracked-, such that we cannot control for pull factors in destination areas (so 
index j refers to origin municipality where household i lives at baseline) 
In equation (1) α2, α3 and  α4 yield consistent estimates of the programme and violence impacts 
and their interaction under the assumption that, conditional on observed characteristics, ij X , there 
are no unobserved factors affecting migration that are correlated to these variables. Concerning 
the programme impacts, we should stress that although the programme was not allocated 
randomly across municipalities, control municipalities have been chosen so to be as similar as 
possible to the treated municipalities and political distortions in the implementation of the 
programme linked to migration are unlikely as migration was not considered among the main 13 
 
objectives of the programme.
9 Moreover, we control for many observable variables, both at the 
municipality and household level, which should attenuate such concerns. However, we cannot 
rule out that violence levels in municipalities may be determined by unobserved factors that also 
affect household migration decisions, in which case the estimates of the parameters of interest 
are likely to be biased. Another concern introduced above with the definition of the sample is 
that the households in our sample may have been selected along unobserved characteristics that 
also explain their subsequent relatively low mobility rate. If selection is systematically related to 
ij ε , estimating equation (1) on the sample at hand can result in inconsistent estimators of the 
parameters of interest. We tackle these two issues in the next two sub-sections.   
 
4.1 Selection of the sample 
 
To investigate for possible selection problems we estimate by maximum likelihood a bivariate 
Probit model with censored selection by estimating equation (1) simultaneously with the 
following selection equation: 
  { } 1' K 0 ij ij ij Sv γ =+ >  (2) 
  
where 1 ij S = when the household in the SISBEN survey (1999) is present also in the FA survey 
in 2002,  and equal to 0 if the household has dropped out in 2002. We allow for possible 
correlation between the error terms of equations (1) and (2) and estimate: 
  corr( , ) ij ij v ρ ε =   
 
The regressors  ij K  we use in the selection equation come mainly from the base SISBEN survey 
that gathers general information on households that were registered in 1999, such as the type of 
social insurance they have, their size and number of children below 18 years old, the age and 
education level of the head and whether he is directly affiliated to a social insurance scheme. A 
summary of these variables is presented below : 
 
 
                                                 
9 A more complete discussion of the implementation of the programme can be found in the report on the evaluation 
results (Attanasio et al, 2006). 14 
 
Variable Description  Mean St.dev. 
  
Data from SISBEN survey (1999): 
  
Affiliated  affiliated to social security  5.47%   
Urban  lives in urban area   49.04%   
educ2  head has primary education level   61.05%   
educ3  head has secondary education level or more  7.26%   
Female head  is  female  25.48%   
Persfami household  size  5.05  2.12 
no_under17 number  children    2.63  1.55 
  
Data from the Police: 
  
displaced  number of displaced people per 100,000 inhabitants  50.66  87.69 
Victims  Victims of massacre per 10,000 inhabitants  0.14  0.50 
Kidnap  number of kidnapped people per 10,000 inhabitants   1.03  2.44 
Notes : number of observations is 19819. 
 
In order for the model to be non parametrically identified, the selection equation should have at 
least one variable that we can exclude from the main probit equation.
10 For this purpose, we use 
an additional data set from the Department of National Planning that provides us with 
information on violence levels in each municipality in the years prior to the SISBEN survey, 
based on reports given by the Police. We use the three additional regressors for our selection 
equation that are going to serve as our identifying instruments as we believe they do not appear 
in the migration Probit equation (1): the numbers of victims of massacre, of displaced people, 
and of kidnapped people per 10,000 inhabitants in each municipality. Hence, our identifying 
assumption is that such pre-1999 information does not explain migration decisions between the 
baseline and follow up surveys (i.e. post 2002) once controlling for violence incidence in the two 
years preceding the survey and many other control variables measured at baseline survey (post 
2002) we have in the FA survey, which are described above and in Table 1 of the Appendix. This 
seems justified if there is no past dependency between migration decisions and violent events 
occurring in the municipality more than three years before the survey. Given the high volatility 
of violence that is observed in the years preceding the survey, we believe that this assumption is 
justified a priori. The results of the selection equation presented in the table below show that, 
under our identifying assumptions, the chosen instruments are relevant as high levels of violence 
have decreased strongly and significantly the probability to remain in the sample of households 
interviewed in 2002. Other factors increase, perhaps not surprisingly, the probability to remain in 
the sample, such as living in an urban part of the municipality, in a larger household, with a 
                                                 
10 Otherwise the model is identified only by a functional form. 15 
 
larger proportion of children, higher education levels of household head and being affiliated to 
the social security. Interestingly, female headed households are more likely to attrit, which may 
capture the high rates of displacement of such households in Colombia.   
 
Determinants of the selection equation 
 Coefficients  Std.  Err.  z  statistic   
Affiliated 0.110 0.040  2.75   
Urban 0.032  0.019  1.72   
educ2 0.063  0.020  3.15   
educ3 0.248  0.038  6.55   
Female -0.061  0.023  -2.69   
Persfami 0.149  0.021  7.13  
Persfami squared  -0.008  0.002  -5.15   
no_under17 0.126  0.024 5.19   
no_under17squared -0.011  0.003  -3.52   
displaced -0.001  0.0001  -13.08   
Victims 0.010  0.018  0.57   
Kidnap -0.031  0.004  -8.10   
_cons -0.676  0.054  -12.57   
Notes: Coefficients obtained with a Probit model. Number of observations 19819  
 
Estimating equations (1) and (2) jointly by maximum likelihood gives an estimated coefficient of 
correlation between the error terms  ˆ 0.23 ρ = ,  which is not significantly different from 0 (with a 
Wald test of independence rejecting its significance at 31% level). This suggests that we may 
safely ignore possible selection problems. Therefore, for the rest of our paper, we estimate 
equation (1) independently, without having to worry about equation (2).  
 
4.2 Endogeneity of violence due to omitted factors 
 
The other important issue in estimating equation (1) is that the incidence of violence may be 
correlated to unobserved factors that also affect directly household migration, which would lead 
to spurious correlations between violence incidence and our outcome of interest.
11 This problem 
                                                 
11 The literature on the impact of violence on economic outcomes sometimes ignores the important problems of 
omitted variables and considers that violence incidence/civil strife measured at community level may be reasonably 
considered as exogenous to household decisions as it does not suffer from the problem of reverse causality (see for 
example Deiniger, 2003). We cannot rule out, however, the problems of endogeneity due to omitted variables, which 
is a general concern that applies to all empirical studies on the relationship between civil conflict and population size 
(Blattman and Miguel, 2008). 16 
 
may be particularly worrying for our empirical analysis as our main proxy for violence is the 
number of displaced households who left the municipality of residence in the year preceding the 
survey. Even though endogeneity biases are less likely to pose problems with our proxies 
measuring past levels of violence at municipality level rather than contemporaneous shocks 
affecting households, we cannot rule out that such proxies may be correlated to unobserved 
heterogeneity at municipality level explaining current household migration decisions. For 
example, the number of displaced households who left the village in the past may capture other 
unobserved factors explaining current migration, such as the intensity of networks living in 
destination areas.  
 
To tackle these issues, we adopted an instrumental variable approach and used the past evolution 
of violence in the municipalities, measured by one and two lagged past levels of violence to 
instrument the level of violence and purge our estimates from any bias due to omitted variables 
at municipality level. From a large set of retrospective data on political violence from the 
National Institute for Statistics (DANE) processed by CERAC (Colombia), we chose to proxy 
lagged past levels of violence in the municipalities of our sample by the number of killings 
related to the armed conflict in 2000 and 2001 and the number of armed conflict related events in 
2000 and 2001. Our exclusion restriction is that these proxies for the past evolution of violence 
are less likely than the number of displaced households to reflect unobservables that would affect 
current migration decisions through, for example, a network effect but they affect directly the 
migration decisions through the increased level of violence they capture.
12 Hence, the model we 
estimate separately in control and treatment municipalities becomes 
{ } 12 3 1' D i s p l a c e d ' X 0 ij ij ij ij Y ββ β ψ =+ + + >   (3) 
-1 -2
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ij ij ij ij ij δ η =∂ +∂ + +   (4) 
  corr( , ) ij ij τ ηψ =   
where  ij Displaced  is the number of displaced households who left the municipality of residence j 
of household i in the year before the baseline survey ; 
                                                 
12 Other instruments for violence levels such as violence in neighbouring municipalities would not be valid based on 
a priori reasons as migration is also likely to be determined by “pull” omitted factors, which may be correlated to the 




ij Violence   are the DANE statistics on the levels of violence in each municipality j in 
2001 (and, respectively, 2000). 
Under the assumption that our instruments are valid, the results of the instrumental regressions 
presented below show that the chosen instruments are powerful (relevant) in explaining the 



















Note : The determinants of the number of displaced households are estimated separately in treated and control 
municipalities by OLS. Standard errors clustered at municipality level in parentheses. ** significant at 5 % level. 
Only the coefficients associated to the identifying instruments are presented. The other control variables are the 
same as  in the main analysis (see Table 2 , specification (1) in the Appendix). 
 
 After estimating equations (3) and (4) jointly by maximum likelihood, we find that the 
coefficient of correlation between the error terms is not significantly different from 0 in 
treatment municipalities (with a point estimate of 0.03  and a Wald test of independence rejecting 
its significance at 38 percent level), or, similarly, in control municipalities (with a point estimate 
of  0.08 and a Wald test of independence rejecting its significance at 26 percent level), such that 
we do not need worrying about possible endogeneity problems of violence incidence in the rest 
of the paper.
14 
                                                 
13 Standard over-identification tests in ivProbit models reported by STATA come out with a P value of 51 % in 
control municipalities and of 68% in treatment municipalities, which suggests that the instruments are valid though 
these tests do not take full account of the clustering in the observations. 
14 We also considered testing for endogeneity problems in the interacted model described by equation (1). However, 
this would have assumed  that  the effects associated to all other control variables are the same in control and 
treatment areas, which is not a priori justified, and is tested below. 18 
 
 
5  Main Results : Impacts of violence and welfare programme on migration 
 
5.1 Impacts of violence on migration 
 
To estimate the effects of violence on migration, we first estimated equation (1) without allowing 
for the interaction between the violence incidence and the programme, hence constraining  4 α  to 
be zero. 
 
Marginal effects   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Treatment area  -0.347  -0.315  -0.577  -0.341 
 (0.515)  (0.486)  (0.505)  (0.512) 
Number of displaced households   0.034  0.033  0.032  0.034 
 (0.012)***  (0.012)***  (0.011)***  (0.012)*** 
1 if curfew\  0 otherwise  0.796  0.828  0.671  0.704 
 (0.545)  (0.520)  (0.537)  (0.523) 
1 if presence of illegal armed groups\  0 
otherwise 
0.875 0.800  0.631  0.890 
 (0.507)*  (0.483)*  (0.476)  (0.507)* 
1 if health centre suffered taskforce 
desertion due to violence\ 0 otherwise 
0.998 0.835  0.965  0.972 
 (0.609)  (0.572)  (0.574)*  (0.600) 
Notes: Marginal effects of a Probit model are reported in percentage points. The number of observations is 10330 
due to missing answers for some of the regressors. Robust standard errors clustered at municipality level in 
parentheses. * significant at 10% ** significant at 5% *** significant at 1%. See Table (2) for the complete list of 
control variables : specification (1) presents the main results. Specification (2) adds some control variables for 
occupation of the household head. Specification (3) controls for social capital in the municipalities in addition to the 
control variables used in specification (1). Specification (4) controls for household income shocks in the year 
preceding the baseline survey in addition to the control variables used in specification (1). 
 
The main results reported in the table above show that violence level, as measured by the number 
of displaced households who left the municipality in the past, has a strong positive impact on 
household migration decisions: increasing violence levels in municipalities such that the number 
of displaced households increases by one standard deviation increases significantly the 
probability to leave the municipality by around 0.5 percentage points, which is large as compared 
to the probability to migrate measured in our sample at around 3.7%. This result is robust 19 
 
whatever the set of other control variables used in specifications (1) to (4), presented in Table (3) 
of the Appendix and discussed with the other determinants of household migration in the 
remaining of the paper. In addition to this effect, the presence of illegal armed groups in the 
municipality increases household migration by more than 0.8 percentage point, but the effect is 
weakly significant (at less than 10 % level) in most of all specifications -i.e. (1) (2) and (4)- that 
do not control for social capital in the municipality. Instead, in specification (3), the effect of 
violence associated to task force desertion in health centres of municipalities becomes weakly 
significant and strong in magnitude (around 1 percentage point). All these results show that 
violence incidence measured at municipality level by several proxies increases strongly and 
significantly the probability of household migration. 
 
We also tested for possible quadratic effects associated to the number of displaced households. 
The negative coefficient associated to the square of this variable turned out to be weakly 
significant at 10 % level or not significant depending on the set of controls which motivated our 
choice of a linear specification. 
 
This table provides also no evidence that receiving welfare benefits in the treatment areas affects 
household migration. This remains true when using more variability in the treatment by 
exploiting an interesting feature of the implementation of the programme: as it did not reach all 
municipalities at the same time, at follow up surveys, the municipalities have received different 
number of payments, which we enter linearly and quadratically among the regressors.
15 We also 
tested for possible interaction effects of the programme with demographic characteristics of the 
households, as they determine the maximum amount of benefits they are entitled to. As we could 
not find any significant effects associated to these interactions, we do not present the results. 
 
52 heterogeneous impacts of the programme along violence incidence 
 
The lack of evidence for programme impacts we found so far is perhaps not surprising as the 
households under study live in environments with varying levels of violence and are credit 
constrained. In these conditions, receiving cash transfers may help some of them to relax their 
                                                 
15 These turned out to be not significant, as shown in Table 3 in Appendix for the linear specification. 20 
 
financial constraints and encourage them to migrate, in particular when violence level is unduly 
high, whereas, in more normal circumstances, welfare benefits may discourage them to leave 
their municipality of residence. This may generate heterogeneous impacts of the programme that 
we now turn to study. To investigate this question we parametised the impact of the programme 
as a function of violence, as shown in equation (1). The results, displayed in Table 4 in Appendix 
show that receiving programme benefits decreases significantly the probability to migrate and 
that violence incidence counteracts this effect. Moreover, programme impacts are attenuated in 
municipalities where violence incidence is high, as shown by the significant and positive effect 
associated to the interaction of violence with the programme effect. These results are confirmed 
when we interact the number of payments received (or intensity of the programme) with the 
proxies for violence, as shown in Table 5.  
 
As the estimates from a Probit model are difficult to interpret, we used them to compute the 
change in the probability to migrate due to the programme at different levels of violence, in order 
to assess the magnitude of these effects.
 16  Figure 3 shows that the negative impact of the 
programme on migration decisions becomes less important the higher the degree of violence, as 
measured by the number of displaced households in the past. The implied change is between -1 
percentage points in municipalities with very low levels of violence and + 2 percentage points 
where violence is high. However, positive effects only affect a minority of municipalities with 
unduly high level of violence. The figure remains similar whatever the set of control variables 
we choose. We then performed the same computations but adding to the programme impact and 
its interactions with violence the direct impact of past displacement on migration. Figure 4 shows 
that, for the large majority of treated villages, the negative effect of the programme more than 
offsets the effect of violence. The total effect becomes positive when more than 20 households 
have left the village in the past, which corresponds to violence levels observed in the 10% most 
violent municipalities of our sample. 
 
5.3 Robustness checks  
 
                                                 
16 This was computed at the mean characteristics of the sample. 21 
 
We now use indicators of different types of shocks affecting households in our survey, including 
violence and death of some household members, and proxies for household wealth to provide 
further evidence on the role of violence and its interactions with household liquidity constraints 
in explaining migration decisions. 
 
We, first, ask whether households affected by violence are more likely to leave their municipality 
of residence. The table below shows that households have been more frequently exposed to 
negative income shocks due to crop losses (27% of the sample for shocks occurring in the last 
two years preceding the survey or 16 % of the sample for shocks occurring in the last year) or to 
illnesses of some of their members (17% in the last two years - 10 % in the last year) than to 
other shocks due to violence (3.3 % - 1.4 %) or death (5.5% - 2.6 %). However, while 
interpreting our results, we should keep in mind that shocks due to violence or death of a 
household member may be under-reported, in particular when households receive death threats, 
which is one of the reasons why we preferred to use for our main results violence incidence 
measured at municipality level. 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if 
household income was affected by: 
Shocks in 2002  Shocks occurring in 
2000/2001/2002 
  Mean St.  dev.  Mean St.dev. 
Death 0.026  0.159  0.055  0.228 
Illness   0.104  0.306  0.169  0.375 
Crop loss    0.161  0.368  0.266  0.442 
Business loss    0.014  0.116  0.025  0.155 
Fire, flood or other natural disaster    0.016  0.126  0.036  0.187 
Violence, robbery or displacement    0.014  0.119  0.033  0.177 
Notes : number of observations : 10303. 
 
As shown in column (4) of Table (2) households affected by a shock due to violence in the year 
preceding the survey are more likely to migrate out of their municipality of residence. The 
impact of such shock is around 3.8 percentage points, which is a very large as compared to the 
3.7% migration rate observed between baseline and follow-up. Moreover, a shock due to death 
increases the probability to migrate by 1.7 percentage points, but this impact is weakly 
significant, at less than 10 %. Other shocks on household income that occur more frequently 
such as crop losses or illness of a household member do not have significant impacts on 
household mobility. Note that we also considered the impacts of shocks occurring earlier in the 
past, but found weaker impacts, which were significant at less than 10% level. This motivates 22 
 
why we only kept in our final specification the proxies for shocks occurring in the year preceding 
the survey. 
 
Results in Table 2 also show that shocks due to crop losses, business losses, fire, flood or other 
natural disaster, which may mainly impact migration decisions through tightening the liquidity 
constraints, have negative impacts on household migration, although the impacts are not 
significant. This suggests that the positive impacts of shocks due to violence or death on 
migration decisions may be even larger (and positive) for households that are not liquidity 
constraints, which is what we now turn to investigate. 
 
We then address whether liquidity constraints are binding for households affected by violence by 
interacting the proxies for household wealth with the shocks due to violence. The survey 
includes several proxies for household wealth as it has detailed data on the value of house and 
land owned by the households, on the amount of their debts they incurred to buy these assets and 
on other debts as well as on their savings. However, while interpreting our results, we have to 
keep in mind that the accumulation of assets or savings at any given date are likely to be 
endogenous to other life-cycle decisions such as migration, which is the reason why we keep 
these results separate from the main results. In order to have an indicator of permanent household 
wealth we use the value of house and land owned by the households, net of household debts. The 
results presented in Table 6 show that household wealth increases significantly the migration of 
households affected by a shock due to the death of one of their members in the year preceding 
the survey (column 2) or of households living in a municipality where illegal armed groups are 
present (column 3). But household wealth does not have significant impacts on migration, when 
it is not interacted with such proxies for violence, as shown in column (1). This suggests once 
again that liquidity constraints are binding for households affected by violence.  
 
One caveat is that the significant positive interaction effect we find between violence and 
household wealth may also capture the fact that illegal armed groups may have targeted the 
richest households in the village, in line with Engel and Ibanez (2007). Although we cannot rule 
out this interpretation, we will see below that there are no other significant interaction effects 
between violence incidence and proxies for household socio-economic characteristics, which 23 
 
would lend further support to this explanation. Moreover, the relatively high migration costs of 
the households in our sample, their lack of access to formal sources of credit, as well as the 
heterogeneous impacts of the programme along violence levels we found are all consistent with 
the first interpretation based on liquidity constraints.  
 
6 Other determinants  
 
6.1 How do the very poor households in our sample respond to other economic motives for 
migration? 
 
The literature has emphasized the importance of economic determinants in migration decisions. 
This is confirmed by the significant negative impacts we find associated to hourly wages in rural 
parts of the municipality. Table (2) in the Appendix shows that an increase of such wages by 
1,000 pesos (which represents more than 1.5 standard deviations from the mean hourly wages in 
our sample) decreases the probability to migrate by around 0.4 percentage point. 
 
Geographic factors make also some areas more attractive than others: for example, the positive 
impact of altitude on migration decisions may indicate that low returns to agriculture in the 
mountains and economic isolation of such areas lead to out-migration. Moreover, to capture 
unobserved factors that may affect migration and differ across regions we control for regional 
effects. Table 2 shows that households living in the Pacific area have a lower probability to 
migrate out of their municipality of residence as compared to households living in the Atlantic 
area, the missing category. 
 
Apart from household size, few household demographic variables determine significantly 
migration decisions of the poor households under study. We find that larger households have a 
lower probability of migrating out their municipality of residence, which may capture the 
negative impact of migration costs. We also find that households headed by young people are 
more likely to migrate, which is easy to interpret in a life-cycle model of economic migration.  
 24 
 
The effects associated to education levels of household heads and spouses are not individually or 
jointly significant. This remains true when we disaggregated the education levels into more 
categories (results not shown). The absence of significant effects associated to education may be 
somehow puzzling if migration is motivated by differential in returns to human capital (Borjas, 
1987). However, there is not much variation in education levels in the sample of very poor 
households under study, such that it is not clear that the education levels of household head and 
spouse capture well enough their job related motives. Therefore we added some indicators of the 
occupation of household head in specification (2) presented in column (2) of Table 2. We find 
that being a self-employed worker or an employer diminishes the probability to migrate, as 
compared to not working, the missing category, which we can easily explain with job related 
motives. Moreover, working in agriculture has a negative impact on migration decisions, which 
is what we expect if human or physical capital accumulated in agriculture is difficult to carry to 
the destination areas of migration, which are most often very large cities. We cannot, however, 
over-interpret these findings in a causal way since occupations are surely endogenous to 
household migration decisions. Therefore, column (2) presents the results with these additional 
controls for occupation separately from the main results in column (1). 
 
Another important determinant of migration emphasized by the literature is the presence and the 
size of networks in origin and destination areas. Although we do not have a direct measure of 
such networks in our data, we included proxies for the level of social capital in the village that 
are likely to affect migration decisions in complex ways. On the one hand social capital may be 
considered as a positive amenity that increases the well-being to live in some municipalities and 
may be viewed as a social asset that is not easily transferable to another community. On the other 
hand, social capital may be correlated to the presence of strong networks, which may facilitate 
migration by decreasing its costs, as mentioned before. Results presented in column (3) of Table 
2 show that social capital, measured by the proportion of women in the municipality 
participating in collective activities, increases significantly household migration
17. Moreover, we 
tried to add household level variables measuring mother’s participation in collective activities. 
As these turned out to be not significant, we did not keep them in our final specification reported 
                                                 
17We use a detailed module of the questionnaire applied to household mothers, which describes participation of 
women in political, religious, sport, neighbourhood or other types of associations.  25 
 
in column (3) of Table 2. As we are worried that all proxies for social capital may be strongly 
correlated to violence levels and migration decisions, we present these results separately from the 
main results. 
 
Moreover, our results outlines the importance of less known factors in explaining migration of 
the very poor households of our sample, such as the types of health insurance they have. Having 
an unsubsidised health insurance -which is most often attached to a good job in formal sector-, 
decreases strongly the probability to leave the municipality of residence (the impact is around 3.3 
percent points, which is very close to the migration rate in the sample). However, only 4 % of the 
sample have access to such insurance scheme, which provides them with the best risk coverage. 
The large majority of households in our sample (around 70%) have, instead, a subsidised health 
insurance. The table below shows that this second best type of insurance also discourages 
household migration, but the effect is weakly significant (at less than 10 % level) and smaller in 
magnitude. These results suggest that health insurance may play an important role in migration 
decisions of the vulnerable households of our sample. However, they could also reflect 
confounding unobserved factors such as risk aversion, which makes this correlation difficult to 
interpret without caution. 
 
Marginal effect   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
1 if =unsubsidized health insurance 
(“best” type), 0 otherwise 
-3.335 -3.432  -3.468  -3.396 
 (1.071)***  (1.057)***  (1.056)***  (1.063)*** 
1 if =subsidized health insurance 
(2
nd best type) ,0 otherwise 
-1.060 -1.130  -1.177  -1.014 
 (0.599)*  (0.585)*  (0.575)**  (0.597)* 
1 if  (3
rd best type), 0 otherwise -0.188  -0.194 -0.252 -0.115 
 (0.674)  (0.653)  (0.638)  (0.670) 
See notes of Table 2 describing the number of observations and list of control variables used in specifications (1) to 
(4). 
 
Other strong determinants of household migration reported in the table below are associated to 
the type of property rights these households have on their dwelling: paying something for living 
in a house (either a rent, mortgage or having a house in usufruct) increases household mobility as 
compared to owning the house, the missing category. This result is, perhaps, not too surprising if 26 
 
ownership reflects household intentions to stay. Moreover, households who occupy a house 
without legal agreement have a lower probability to migrate, which may simply reflect their 
difficulties to find similar informal agreements, if they migrate. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
1 if house is rented or in mortgage, 0 
otherwise 
1.924 1.749 1.779 1.883 
  (0.544)*** (0.520)*** (0.520)*** (0.526)*** 
1 if house is occupied without legal 
agreement, 0 otherwise 
-2.530 -2.679 -2.662 -2.513 
  (1.484)* (1.457)* (1.464)* (1.459)* 
1 if house is in usufruct, 0 otherwise  1.042  0.925  0.938  1.027 
 (0.391)***  (0.384)**  (0.387)**  (0.387)*** 
See notes of Table 2. 
 
6.2  Does violence incidence modify other economic incentives to migrate? 
 
We have already outlined that the programme impacts on migration are not the same depending 
on the levels of violence. More generally, it is also questionable whether political violence 
affects differently migration incentives of households with different characteristics, as may be 
the case when households are displaced by violence (Engel and Ibanez, 2007). To address this 
issue, we interacted the proxies for violence discussed above with household characteristics. 
 
We did not find any significant effects associated to the interactions of violence with socio-
economic characteristics like education levels of the head and the spouse, or indicators of 
working on family businesses, contrary to what we would have expected if such households were 
more likely to be threatened by violence. Nor did we find any significant interaction effects of 
violence levels with indicators of household participation in collective activities, which we 
would have expected if households with strong social connections were strategically targeted by 
illegal armed groups. Hence households in our sample seem to behave differently than if their 
mobility were entirely forced. One possible explanation for these findings is that the households 
in our sample that are eligible for the FA programme are the most deprived households living in 27 
 
rural areas of Colombia. This is thus maybe not too surprising if illegal armed groups did not 




We have shown that household migration decisions respond strongly and positively to the level 
of violence and other socio-economic factors. These results are very interesting as they stress 
that both socio-economic factors and violence incidence are playing an important role in 
explaining household migration in rural areas of Colombia. Although similar results have been 
found by Engel and Ibanez (2007) and Czaika and Kis-Katos (2009), what is particularly 
interesting in our context is that the households of our sample are extremely poor, such that 
migration decisions are likely to be severely liquidity constrained. In this context, we find that 
receiving welfare benefits such as conditional cash transfers of the FA programme discourages 
household migration only if violence incidence is not unduly high. For the large majority of 
households in our sample, our estimates show that receiving welfare benefits more than offsets 
the positive impact of violence on migration measured by the number of displaced households 
who left the municipality of residence in the past. However, if violence becomes unduly high, 
receiving welfare benefits increases household probability to migrate.  
 
The paper shows further evidence on the role played by liquidity constraints in migration 
decisions, as wealthier households are more likely to migrate after a recent shock due to the 
death of a household member or from municipalities where illegal armed groups are present. 
Such interaction impacts between liquidity constraints and violence incidence give a consistent 
explanation of our results showing that receiving welfare benefits tends to discourage households 
to migrate, unless violence levels are particularly high. 
 
Our results have interesting policy implications if a government’s aim were to control migration 
flows out of some municipalities destabilised by the civil conflict. Even though welfare 
programmes such as FA may be used as a way of curbing out-migration flows in some areas, 
they are not effective at mitigating migration flows in municipalities with very high level of 28 
 
violence. This warns us to be careful when extrapolating our results to advocate policy 
interventions in emergency situations that lead to large flows of displaced population. 
 
We also find that migration decisions of the very poor households in our sample are strongly 
determined by their property rights, by the type of health insurance and jobs they hold. This 
further suggests that policy measures oriented towards access to housing market and health 
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Appendix : Complementary details on the definition of the sample  
 
 
The FA data allow us to identify a sample of 434 households that have moved out of their 
municipality of residence between the two surveys and 1316 households that have changed 
location within their municipality of residence. In this study we focus only on household 
decision to leave the municipality of residence for two main reasons. First, the data do not give 
us information on the levels of violence across different parts of the municipality and the FA 
programme is administrated homogenously everywhere within each municipality, such that we 
cannot test our model predictions for migration decisions “within” the municipality. Second, on 
a priori grounds, these two types of migration decisions have different economic determinants 
since migration costs and benefits involved are not the same. This is also what is reported by the 
migrants themselves, as described below: 
 
Main reason for having migrated 
between baseline and follow-up 
 (1)  
% of answers 
 (2) 
% of answers 
Violence 1.9  14.9 
For job related reasons  16.9  54.4 
To find better accomodation  22.8  2.6 
To live closer to relatives  8.3  14.0 
To live closer to the centre  1.0  0.0 
To live closer to college  3.8  3.6 
Others 45.3  10.5 
Notes:   (1) Households who migrated “within” the municipality.  (2) Households who migrated “out” of their 
municipality. In total 114 households have migrated “out” of their residence municipality and are successfully 
tracked by the surveyors for the follow-up survey. See text for more details. 
 
The table shows that motives linked to violence are only mentioned by 2 % of the households 
who relocated within their municipality of residence, as compared to 15% of the households who 
migrated out of their municipality of residence. Moreover, it is likely that a large fraction of 
households who moved out of their municipality of residence to escape from threats of violence 
did not want to leave their address to their neighbours or relatives, in which case the sizeable 
proportion of reasons related to violence (14.9%) may be underestimated in the sub-sample of 
migrants who were successfully tracked at the first follow-up. 
 
Note that there is also a limited source of information on individual migration in the first survey, 
which reports if household members have left their household but does not report where they 32 
 
resettled. We can identify 3237 departures of individuals, which represent approximately 11.7 % 
of the sample followed by the surveyors for the first follow-up. However, we were worried that 
most of these departures are relocations within the municipality of residence. To check for this 
problem, a variable was added in the second follow-up survey, which allows us to assess that 
half of the individuals who have left their household between the second and the third surveys 
are still living in the same municipalities. Therefore we choose not to use the information on 
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Figure 2 
Distribution of number of displaced households who left the municipality of residence of 
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treat  0.58  0.60  1 if treated municipality\  0 otherwise  
(0.49) (0.49) 
expo  3.58  3.56  number of payments received at follow-up in municipality 
(3.47) (3.35) 
wagem_r  1236.03  1248.15  Average hourly wage in rural part of municipality 
(710.22) (569.8) 
wagem_u  1174.53  1200.6*  Average hourly wage in urban part of municipality 
(323.94) (287.72) 
urbr_1  0.49  0.49  1 if lives in urban\  0 otherwise. 
(0.50) (0.50) 
urbr_2  0.41  0.40  1 if lives in a rural but disperse part of the municipality\ 0 
otherwise (0.49) (0.49) 
urbr_3  0.10  0.11  1 if lives in a rural but populated part of the municipality\ 0 
otherwise   (0.29) (0.31) 
pershog  6.10  5.55*  Number of people in the household 
(2.44) (2.55) 
age_head  45.95  43.10*  Age of the head of household 
(13.13) (13.27) 
single  0.20  0.26*  1 if the household head is single\0 otherwise 
(0.40) (0.44) 
ss_h1  0.04  0.02*  1 if head of household has unsubsidized health insurance\ 0 
otherwise (0.21) (0.15) 
ss_h2  0.69  0.63*  1 if head of household has subsidized health insurance\ 0 
otherwise (0.46) (0.48) 
ss_h3  0.17  0.24*  if head of household has a letter from the municipality that  is 
similar to subsidized health insurance\0 otherwise  (0.38) (0.43) 
eduh  0.25  0.26   1 if head of household has at least completed the primary 
school\ 0 otherwise (0.43) (0.44) 
edus  0.24  0.24  1 if the spouse has at least completed the primary school\ 0 
otherwise (0.43) (0.43) 
edu_h1  0.27  0.24  1 if head of household has not education\ 0 otherwise 
(0.44) (0.43) 
edu_h2  0.46  0.47  1 if  the head of household has primary not completed\ 0 
otherwise (0.50) (0.50) 
edu_h3  0.14  0.14  1 if head of household has completed primary school\ 0 
otherwise (0.35) (0.34) 
edu_h4  0.09  0.11  1 if head of household secondary not completed\ 0 otherwise 
(0.29) (0.31) 
edu_h5  0.04  0.04  1 if head of household secondary completed or more\ 0 
otherwise (0.19) (0.19) 
houseown_1  0.69  0.53*  1 if house is owned\ 0 otherwise 
(0.46) (0.50) 
houseown_2  0.06  0.18*  1 if house is rented or in mortgage\ 0 otherwise 
(0.24) (0.38) 
houseown_3  0.05  0.02*  1 if house is occupied without legal agreement\ 0 otherwise  
(0.21) (0.13) 
houseown_4  0.20  0.26*  1 if house is in usufruct \ 0 otherwise 
(0.40) (0.44) 
Region : Oriental  0.21  0.23  1 if lives in region:Oriental\ 0 otherwise 
(0.41) (0.42) 36 
 
Region : Central  0.24  0.33  1 if lives in region:Central\ 0 otherwise 
(0.43) (0.47) 
Region : Pacific  0.13  0.09  1 if lives in region:Pacific\ 0 otherwise 
(0.34) (0.28) 
altitude 595.86  642.15  altitude    to the sea level in metres 
(735.94) (717.26) 
cab2002  15382.8 13677.12  population in the urban part in 2002 
(17921. (15285.00
res2002  14034.3 13695.38  population in the rural part in 2002 
(11151. (9754.95) 
#urban  schools 
 
















4.88  5.51*  number of public puestos 
(4.61) (5.46) 
#pharmacies 8.64  8.79 number  of  pharmacies 
(6.70) (7.09) 
d_desertion  0.09  0.17*  1 if in any health center of our sample in the municipality 
suffered taskforce desertion, due to violence\ 0 otherwise  (0.29) (0.38) 
d_strike  0.25  0.30*  1 if in any health center of our sample in the municipality 
suffered taskforce strike\ 0 otherwise (0.43) (0.46) 
curfew  0.12  0.15*  1 if curfew in municipality\ 0 otherwise 
(0.32) (0.35) 
eln_farc_pm  0.61  0.73*  1 if  ELN, FARC or paramilitary groups in the municipality \ 
0 otherwise (0.49) (0.44) 




5.42  10.19*  Number of displaced households from the municipality during 
the year before baseline (13.51) (20.52) 
group  0.28  0.31  % of women participating in collective activity in the village 
(0.17) (0.18) 
work  0.82  0.77*  1 if head works\ 0 otherwise 
(0.38) (0.42) 
farm  0.46  0.38*  1 if head works in agriculture\ 0 otherwise 
(0.49) (0.48) 
familywork  0.01  0.01  1 if head works in family enterprise\ 0 otherwise 
(0.10) (0.09) 
employer  0.03  0.02  1 if head is an employer\ 0 otherwise 
(0.16) (0.14) 
self_employed  0.40  0.29*  1 if head is self-employed\ 0 otherwise 
(0.49) (0.46) 
employed  0.35  0.39*  1 if head is employed\ 0 otherwise 
(0.48) (0.49) 
Observations  11177 435  Total number of observations
Column (1) households who have not migrated 
Column (2) households who migrated out of their municipality of residence between baseline and follow-up 
surveys. 
Significantly different as compared to the group of non migrants 37 
 
Table 2 Determinants of household migration 
 
  (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
       
treat  -0.347 -0.315  -0.577 -0.341 
  (0.515) (0.486)  (0.505) (0.512) 
 number of displaced 
households 
0.034 0.033  0.032 0.034 
  (0.012)*** (0.012)***  (0.011)*** (0.012)*** 
curfew  0.796 0.828  0.671 0.704 
  (0.545) (0.520)  (0.537) (0.523) 
Presence of  eln/farc/pm  0.875  0.800  0.631  0.890 
 (0.507)*  (0.483)*  (0.476)  (0.507)* 
wage  in  urban  0.009 0.008  0.009 0.009 
  (0.009) (0.009)  (0.009) (0.009) 
wage in rural  -0.004  -0.004  -0.004  -0.004 
  (0.002)* (0.002)*  (0.002)* (0.002)* 
edus  -0.819 -0.729  -0.753 -0.897 
  (0.605) (0.586)  (0.583) (0.599) 
eduh  -0.014 -0.117  -0.126 0.022 
  (0.666) (0.635)  (0.631) (0.656) 
pershog  -0.731 -0.749  -0.754 -0.766 
  (0.205)*** (0.203)***  (0.200)*** (0.203)*** 
pershogsq  0.035 0.036  0.037 0.037 
  (0.011)*** (0.011)***  (0.011)*** (0.011)*** 
unsubsidized health 
insurance 
-3.335 -3.432  -3.468 -3.396 
  (1.071)*** (1.057)***  (1.056)*** (1.063)*** 
subsidized health 
insurance 
-1.060 -1.130  -1.177 -1.014 
 (0.599)*  (0.585)*  (0.575)**  (0.597)* 
informally subsidised 
insurance 
-0.188 -0.194  -0.252 -0.115 
  (0.674) (0.653)  (0.638) (0.670) 
  age_head  -0.030 -0.036  -0.036 -0.030 
 (0.012)**  (0.013)***  (0.013)***  (0.012)** 
 single  0.639  -0.144  -0.120  0.584 
  (0.405) (0.434)  (0.436) (0.395) 
rented  house  1.924 1.749  1.779 1.883 
  (0.544)*** (0.520)***  (0.520)*** (0.526)*** 
occupied  house  -2.530 -2.679  -2.662 -2.513 
  (1.484)* (1.457)*  (1.464)* (1.459)* 
house  in  usufruct  1.042 0.925  0.938 1.027 
 (0.391)***  (0.384)**  (0.387)**  (0.387)*** 
Region:  Oriental  -0.987 -0.779  -1.109 -0.988 
  (0.750) (0.732)  (0.742) (0.744) 
Region : Central  0.621  0.724  0.330  0.648 
  (0.561) (0.532)  (0.608) (0.559) 
Region  :  Pacific  -1.923 -1.932  -1.963 -1.940 
  (0.968)** (0.931)**  (0.897)** (0.956)** 
altitude  0.001 0.001  0.001 0.001 
  (0.000)** (0.000)**  (0.000)** (0.000)** 
urban  population -0.000 -0.000  -0.000 -0.000 
  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
rural  population  -0.000 -0.000  -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)*  (0.000) 38 
 
#urban  schools  -0.068 -0.057  -0.020 -0.065 
  (0.052) (0.050)  (0.057) (0.052) 
#rural  schools  0.019 0.020  0.022 0.017 
 (0.010)*  (0.010)*  (0.010)**  (0.010)* 
#hospitals  0.833 0.709  0.583 0.767 
  (0.738) (0.738)  (0.704) (0.737) 
#centros  0.106 0.071  0.075 0.091 
  (0.202) (0.193)  (0.194) (0.204) 
#puestos  0.078 0.078  0.073 0.080 
 (0.045)*  (0.045)*  (0.044)  (0.046)* 
#pharmacies  0.054 0.050  0.031 0.049 
  (0.054) (0.051)  (0.056) (0.053) 
task force desertion  0.998  0.835  0.965  0.972 
 (0.609)  (0.572)  (0.574)*  (0.600) 
task force strike  -0.010  0.010  0.144  0.015 
  (0.490) (0.470)  (0.459) (0.491) 
disperse rural  2.267  45.653  46.736  2.356 
  (50.510) (52.351)  (52.023) (50.015) 
populated rural  93.516  115.090  125.248  100.935 
 (61.740)  (60.303)*  (60.707)**  (61.960) 
farm   -1.034    
   (0.451)**    
domestic_employee   0.494    
   (0.920)    
employee   -0.575    
   (0.556)    
self_employed   -1.527    
   (0.501)***    
own_business_farm   -2.440    
   (1.081)**    
family_work   0.367    
   (1.579)    
shock due to death        1.664 
      (0.893)* 
shock due to illness        0.158 
      (0.598) 
shock due to crop losses        -0.515 
      (0.427) 
shock due to business 
losses 
    -0.429 
      (1.597) 
shock due to fire, flood, 
natural disater 
    -0.998 
      (1.526) 
shock due to violence        3.768 
      (1.002)*** 
group     0.025   
     (0.012)**   
Notes : Marginal effects from a dProbit are reported in percentage points. Number of observations : 10330. Robust 
standard errors clustered at municipality level in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%. Specification (1) presents the main results. Specification (2) adds some control variables for 
occupation of the household head. Specification (3) controls for social capital in the municipalities in addition to the 
control variables used in specification (1). Specification (4) controls for household income shocks in the year 
preceding the baseline survey in addition to the control variables used in specification (1). 39 
 
 
Table 3: migration determinants with intensity effects of the programme 
 
  (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
       
Programme Intensity   -0.067 -0.051  -0.071 -0.064 
(number of payments)  (0.072)  (0.068)  (0.068)  (0.071) 
Number of displaced 
households 
0.034 0.033  0.033 0.034 
  (0.012)*** (0.012)***  (0.011)*** (0.012)*** 
curfew  0.702 0.746  0.546 0.612 
  (0.536) (0.513)  (0.536) (0.513) 
Presence of  eln/farc/pm  0.859  0.785  0.621  0.874 
 (0.500)*  (0.477)*  (0.478)  (0.499)* 
Notes : Marginal effects from a dProbit are reported. Number of observations : 10330. Robust standard errors 
clustered at municipality level in parentheses. All other control variables not reported in the Table are the same as in 
Table 2. All parameters and standard errors have been multiplied by 100.  




Table 4: heterogeneous impacts of the programme along violence levels 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
Programme effect (treat)  -15.284  -14.273  -17.062 
 (10.051)  (10.064)  (9.577)* 
Interaction effect of 
programme with violence  
0.826 0.827  0.869 
 (0.249)***  (0.262)***  (0.229)*** 
violence effect  0.388  0.375  0.351 
 (0.148)***  (0.144)***  (0.143)** 
Notes : The coefficients from a Probit model are multiplied by 100 with robust standard errors clustered at 
municipality level in parentheses. Number of observations : 10330. Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%.  
Violence incidence is measured by the number of displaced households who left the municipality. 
We only report the impact of violence associated to the number of displaced households and its interaction with the 
programme as other proxies for violence (and their interactions) do not have significant impacts at conventional 
levels.  
The specification in column (1) includes the main control variables, Column (2) adds some controls for occupations 
of household heads, and column (3) adds controls for social capital (see Table 2).  41 
 
 
Table 5: heterogeneous impacts of the programme along violence levels with intensity effects of the 
programme. 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
Intensity effect of the programme 
(number of payments) 
-2.346 -2.129  -2.238 
 (1.346)*  (1.360)  (1.276)* 
Interaction effect of intensity of 
programme with violence 
0.142 0.136  0.145 
 (0.049)***  (0.051)***  (0.044)*** 
violence effect  5.220  4.442  3.433 
 (10.656)  (10.462)  (10.185) 
observations 10303  10303  10303 




Table 6  Interaction impacts between household wealth and violence 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
number of displaced 
households in municipality 
0.479 0.482 0.477 
  (0.170)*** (0.169)*** (0.169)***
presence of illegal armed 
groups in municipality 
12.125 11.904 6.767 
  (7.100)* (7.085)* (7.892)
shock in 2002 due to violence    51.355 56.725  
  (13.799)*** (14.388)***  
shock in 2002 due to death  21.746 17.387
  (12.550)* (13.080)   
Value of property  0.450 0.096 -1.219 
  (0.296) (0.399) (1.091)
Value of property interacted 
with shock due to death 
 0.941   
   (0.399)**
Value of property interacted 
with shock due to violence 
 -1.344   
   (1.182)   
Value of property interacted 
with presence of illegal armed 
groups 
  1.889 
    (1.107)* 
Notes : The coefficients from a Probit model are multiplied by 100 with robust standard errors clustered at 
municipality level in parentheses. Number of observations : 10330. Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%. 
Violence incidence is measured by the number of displaced households who left the municipality. 
We only report the interactions of violence incidence at municipality level with household wealth that are significant 
at conventional levels. Additional control variables not shown in the table are the same as for the main results 
presented in specification (1) of Table 2. 